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Abstract
This paper presents an empirical study of the mutation
techniques used by the tool PASTE. This tool allows the
automation of our passive testing methodology for systems
that present stochastic-time information. In our proposal,
invariants express the fact that each time the implementa-
tion under test performs a given sequence of actions, then
it must exhibit a behavior according to the probability dis-
tribution functions reflected in the invariant. We briefly re-
view the theoretical framework of our methodology and the
main features of our tool. Next, we present in detail the
Mutants module that provides us with a functionality
to test the effectiveness of invariants for detecting errors.
Finally, we present a study of the results obtained from the
performed experiments.
1 Introduction
Formal testing techniques [6, 18, 16, 24] provide sys-
tematic procedures to check implementations with respect
to a specification in such a way that the coverage of criti-
cal parts/aspects of the system under test is increased. Ini-
tially, these techniques focused on the functional behavior
of systems, such as determining whether the tested system
can, on the one hand, perform certain actions and, on the
other hand, does not perform some unexpected ones. Never-
theless, there exist many systems where non-functional as-
pects, such as the probability of an event to happen, the time
that it takes to perform a certain action, or the time when a
certain action happens, make the difference between correct
and incorrect behaviors. During the last two decades there
has been a lot of interest in extending formal techniques to
cope with time. Even though there exist several propos-
als for timed testing [19, 10, 14, 25, 11, 22, 20], most of
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them specialize in active testing, assuming that the tester
is allowed to interact directly with the system. However,
sometimes testers cannot interact with the system. In those
situations, testing methodologies make use of monitoring
techniques, that extract traces from the implementation that
can be analyzed in order to detect errors. This paradigm
is called passive testing. There are several proposals for
formal passive testing [4, 5, 17], but they focuses on check-
ing wether the systems satisfy functional properties, such
as “after the input i the systems always emits the output
o”. Our work is based on [4, 5]. In this approach, a set of
properties, called invariants, are checked against the traces
observed from the implementation to test their correctness.
We extended this idea in [2] by adding stochastic time re-
quirements in the specification and in the invariants. There,
we present algorithms to verify the time-correctness of the
invariants with respect to the specification and to assess the
time-correctness of the recorder traces with respect to the
invariants. We present a formalism based on finite state
machines, allowing to take into account temporal aspects.
The time is represented by means of probability distribu-
tion functions, it allows that instead of having expressions
such as “the action o takes t time units to be performed” we
will have expressions such as “with probability p the action
o will be performed before t time units”.
We have developed a tool, called PASTE, where the al-
gorithms proposed for checking the correctness of the in-
variants and the recorder traces have been implemented. In
addition to the automation of our methodology, the tool pro-
vides the tester with a functionality that allows to check
the effectiveness of invariants to detect errors, by apply-
ing them to simulated traces. In order to generate these
traces we have applied a methodology based on mutation
testing [23, 12, 26, 21, 13]. Originally, mutation testing
was applied to code [15, 7] but some work has looked at
specification mutation [8]. Here, the specification is mu-
tated and for each mutant a test is derived that distinguishes
the behaviours of the mutated and original specifications.
Most work on mutating specifications has used either finite
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state machines or extended finite state machines, but there
are not many proposals to mutate non-functional properties
(see [13] for such a proposal). Another use of mutation test-
ing is the evaluation of other test techniques [3]. In particu-
lar, in order to evaluate a test techniquewe can produce test
suites using this technique and estimate their effectiveness
by determining what proportion of mutants they kill. In this
paper we present the mutants module of our tool where the
specification is mutated and traces are extracted from these
mutants for evaluating a measure of the quality of the invari-
ants proposed for detecting errors. These traces are chosen
in order to simulate real faults. Thus, if we have an invariant
that can find an error in the trace recorded from the mutant,
then this invariant has more probability to find an error in
a faulty implementation. We describe the different muta-
tion operators that can be applied to the specification. In
addition, we present approaches for measuring the level of
detection of the invariants and analyze the empirical results
obtained from different experiments.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next sec-
tion we introduce our framework to perform passive testing
in systems with stochastic time restrictions. In Section 3
we present the tool PASTE. Section 4 explains how the mu-
tants module works and we introduce the mutation opera-
tors and the generation of simulated traces. In Section 5 we
present the empirical result obtained from the experiments
performed in PASTE. Finally, in Section 6 we present our
conclusions and some lines for future work.
2 The theoretical framework
In this Section we remind the main aspects of the frame-
work to perform passive testing in systems with temporal
restrictions introduced in [1, 2]. First, we present the for-
malism that we use in order to represent systems with tem-
poral restrictions. This formalism is an extension of the
classical finite state machine (FSM). The main difference
with respect to usual FSMs consists in the addition of time
to indicate the lapse between offering an input and receiv-
ing an output. We use probability distribution functions to
model this time. Essentially, these functions provide us with
the probability that the system performs an action before an
amount of time. Next, we introduce some basic concepts on
probability distribution functions.
Definition 1 A probability distribution function is a func-
tion F : IR+ −→ [0, 1], having the following properties:
• limt→+∞ F (t) = 1.
• F is monotonically increasing, that is, for all t1, t2 ∈
IR+ such that t1 ≤ t2 we have F (t1) ≤ F (t2).
• F is a right-continuous function at any point, that is,
for all t ∈ IR+ we have:
lim
t′→t+
F (t′) = F (t).
We denote the set of probability distribution functions
by F (F, F1, F2 to range over F ). Let F1 and F2 be two
probability distribution functions. We write F1 = F2 if for
all t ∈ IR+ we have F1(t) = F2(t). We will call sample to
any multiset of positive real numbers.
Let F be a probability distribution function and J be a
sample. We denote the confidence of F on J by γ(F, J). In
our setting, samples will be associated with time values that
implementations need to perform sequences of actions. We
have that γ(F, J) takes values in the interval [0, 1]. unionsq
Intuitively, bigger values of γ(F, J) indicate that the ob-
served sample J is more likely to be produced by the proba-
bility distributed function F . That is, γ decides how similar
is the probability distribution function generated by J and
the one corresponding to F are.
Next, we briefly mention some well-known probability
distribution functions families that we consider along the
paper. They are classified in two types: continuous (uni-
form, and exponential) and discrete (binomial, discrete and
dirac) probability distribution functions. For example, let
us consider the following continuos distribution:
F1(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if t ≤ α
t−α
β−α if α ≤ t < β
1 if β ≤ t
We say thatF1 is uniformly distributed in the interval [α, β].
Uniform distributions allow us to keep compatibility with
time intervals in timed models in the sense that the same
weight is assigned to all the times in the interval. The next
function, F2, follows a Dirac distribution in α.
F2(t) =
{
0 if 0 ≤ t < α
1 if a ≤ t
The idea is that the corresponding delay will be equal to α
time units. Dirac distributions allow us to simulate deter-
ministic delays appearing in timed models.
Definition 2 A Timed Finite State Machine, in short TFSM,
is a tuple X = (S, I, O,→, s0) where S is a finite set of
states, I is the set of input actions, O is the set of output
actions,→ is the set of transitions, and s0 is the initial state.
A transition belonging to → is a tuple (s, s′, i, o, F )
where s, s′ ∈ S are the initial and final states of the tran-
sition, i ∈ I and o ∈ O are the input and output actions,
respectively, and F ∈ F denotes the time, in probability
terms, that the transition needs to be completed.
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s1 s2
s3 s4 s5 s6
s7 s8 s9 s10
i1/o1/F1
i2/o2/F1
i1/o7/F3
i1/o6/F2
i1/o1/F1
i2/o8/F2
i2/o2/F1
i1/o2/F1, i2/o5/F3 i2/o4/F2
i1/o1/F1
i2/o4/F2
i2/o2/F1
i2/o8/F2 i2/o9/F1
i1/o5/F1
i2/o7/F1
i1/o3/F1, i2/o6/F3
i1/o10/F1, i2/o9/F1
i1/o3/F1
i1/o4/F3
F1(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if t < 0
t
2
if 0 ≤ t < 2
1 if 2 ≤ t
F2(t) =
{
0 if t < 4
1 if 4 ≤ t
F3(t) =
{
1− e
−t
3 if 0 ≤ t
0 if 0 > t
Figure 1. Example of TFSM.
We say that X is input-enabled if for all state s ∈ S and
input i ∈ I , there exist s′ ∈ S, o ∈ O, and F ∈ F such
that (s, s′, i, o, F ) ∈ →. We say that X is deterministically
observable if for all s, i, o there do not exist two different
transitions (s, i, o, F, s1), (s, i, o, F, s2) ∈ δ. We say that
X has regular stochastic information, if there do not exist
two different transitions tr1 = (s′1, s′′1 , i, o, F1) and tr2 =
(s′2, s
′′
2 , i, o, F2) with F1 = F2. unionsq
In our framework, we assume that we are provided with
a complete input-enabled specification, and it has regular
stochastic information. The idea is that actions that produce
the same output may be related with respect the amount of
time that they need to be performed. In addition, implemen-
tations and specifications are deterministically observable.
Intuitively, a transition (s, s′, i, o, F ) indicates that if the
machine is in state s and receives the input i then the ma-
chine emits the output o before t time units with probability
F (t) and the machine changes its current state to s′.
Example 1 Let us consider the machineX depicted in Fig-
ure 1. It represents the specification of a system by using a
TFSM model. Each transition has an associated probability
distribution function. It is worth to note that in the transi-
tions set, all transitions that share the same pair input-output
have associated the same stochastic distribution function.
The functionF1 corresponds to a continuous uniform distri-
bution in the interval [0, 2], the function F2 follows a Dirac
distribution in 4, and F3 belongs to the family of exponen-
tial distribution functions. For example, if X is in the state
s3 and receives the input action i2, thenX triggers the tran-
sition (s3, s4, i2, o8, F2) and emits the output o8 after a time
given by F2, in this case 4 units of time. unionsq
Next, we introduce the notion of time invariant. The time
invariants allow us to express temporal properties that must
be fulfilled by the implementation. For example, we could
express that the time the system takes to perform a transition
always belongs to a specific interval having all values the
same probability. We could consider that the invariants are
extracted from the specification. In fact, we can do this eas-
ily by adapting the method given in [9] to our timed frame-
work. However, this leads to a huge set of invariants, where
not all of them are relevant. In our approach we assume that
time invariants are given by the tester from the original re-
quirements (for more details [5, 1]). Consequently, we need
to check that the time invariants presented by the tester are
correct with respect to the specification. Once we have a
collection of correct time invariants, we will have to control
if these invariants are satisfied by the timed-traces produced
by the implementation. A trace represents a sequence of ac-
tions that the system may perform from its origin state. We
provide in [1, 2] algorithms to verify the correctness of the
invariants with respect to the specification, and the traces
with respect to the invariants.
Definition 3 Let X = (S, I, O,→, s0) be a TFSM. We say
that a sequence φ is a time invariant for X if the following
two conditions hold:
1. φ is defined according to the following EBNF:
φ ::= a/z/F, φ | , φ′ | i 	→ C
φ′ ::= i/z/F, φ | i 	→ C
In this expression we consider F ∈ F , i ∈ I , a ∈
I ∪ {?}, z ∈ O ∪ {?}, and C ⊆ O ×F .
2. φ is correct [1] with respect to X .
unionsq
In order to express traces in a concise way, we will use
the wild-card characters ? and . The wild-car ? represents
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any value in the sets I andO, while  represents a sequence
of input/output pairs.
Intuitively, the previous EBNF expresses that an invari-
ant is either a sequence of symbols where each component,
but the last one, is either an expression a/z/F , with a be-
ing an input action or the wild-card character ?, z being an
output action or the wild-card character ?, and F being a
probability distribution function, or an expression . There
are two restrictions to this rule. First, an invariant cannot
contain two consecutive expressions  and . In the case
that such situation was needed to represent a property, the
tester could simulate it by means of the expression . The
second restriction is that an invariant cannot present a com-
ponent of the form  followed by an expression beginning
with the wildcard character ?, that is, the input of the next
component must be a real input action i ∈ I. In fact,  rep-
resents any sequence of inputs/outputs pairs such that the
input is not equal to i. The last component, called head
of the invariant, corresponding to the expression i 	→ C, is
an input action followed by a set of pairs that associate an
output with a probability distribution function. For exam-
ple, the semantic of an invariant i 	→ {〈o, F 〉} is that if we
observe the input i, obligatory, we will observe the output
o, in a lapse of time that fits the function F . This a basic in-
variant, but we can build one more complex with wildcards:
i/o/F, , i′ 	→ {〈o, F1〉, 〈o
′, F2〉}. The meaning of this in-
variant is that if we observe the transition i/o in a time that
can be generated by the functionF , then the first occurrence
of the input symbol i′, after a lapse of any amount of time,
must be followed by the output o or o′ having associated a
time from F1 and F2 respectively.
Given a set of time invariants and before checking them
against the traces obtained from the implementation, they
must be checked against the specification, in order to avoid
that an invariant violates the requirements expressed in the
specification. Once we have a set of correct invariants, we
use them for checking the traces obtained from the imple-
mentation. If the time invariant detects a mismatch, then
the implementation that has generated this trace is incorrect
with respect to the specification.
In order to check the correctness of a trace with re-
spect to an invariant, first, we review the non-temporal be-
haviours. Intuitively, an invariant will detect an error if
there exists a subsequence of the trace that does not match
the invariant. For example, if we consider the invariant
i/o/F, , i′ 	→ {〈o, F1〉, 〈o
′, F2〉}, each time we find in the
trace a subsequence starting with the input i paired with the
output symbol o, the first occurrence of the input i′ should
be paired with either the output o or the output o′. Never-
theless, if we do not find such subsequence in the trace, that
is, there is no occurrence of the pair i/o, we cannot emit a
verdict. Once we confirm that a trace fulfills these require-
ments, we will have to check if the temporal behaviour sat-
isfies the constraints expressed in the invariant by means of
the associated probability distribution functions. In order
to establish if the amounts of time that the implementation
takes to perform the actions fits the probability distribution
functions, we need to collect samples that we can compare
with it using a hypothesis contrast. Each sample will be as-
sociated with a pair input/output. These samples need to be
compared with the probabilistic distribution functions asso-
ciated to the corresponding pair. This comparison is based
on statistical results. In our tool, we implement the Chi-
Square Goodness-of-Fit Test. This test has the form:
∑ (observed− expected)2
expected
This test provides us with a grade of confidence relative to
the probability of obtaining a sample from the distribution
function.
3 PASTE: A Tool PASive TEsting
In addition to the theoretical framework we have devel-
oped a tool called PASsive TEsting (PASTE) which imple-
ments the algorithms defined for our framework and helps
to automate of our passive testing approaches. In Figure 2
we present a graphical representation of the kernel mod-
ules and the relationships among them. The input data are
stored in XML format. They include information regard-
ing to the specification of the system, described by means
of the TFSM formalism, the invariants that we consider, and
the traces obtained from the implementation under test.
After loading the input data, the tool allows us to verify
the correctness of the invariants with respect to the specifi-
cation. When we have a set of correct invariants, we will
check the correctness of the traces obtained from the imple-
mentation under test with respect to them. Finally, the tool
will provide us with statistical results about the number of
errors found, the invariant that has revealed more faults, etc.
We detected that the order the invariants are applied
could be a decisive factor for this task, that is, some in-
variants have more power than others for detecting faults.
So, it would be an advantage if we could select the best set
of invariants. By best we mean that the application of this
set of invariants to the traces in order to check their correct-
ness is more efficient revealing errors. Thus, we need to be
able to establish the level of detection of faults of the possi-
ble invariants for comparing them and choose the best ones.
With this goal, we decided to test the invariants with respect
to a specific set of traces that could present errors and com-
pare the results. In this way, a tester has the possibility of
known how good is an invariant for an specification. This
fact caused the integration of a new module in PASTE that
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InvariantsCorrect?Spec
Mutants
Traces
eq? XML Correct?
generate
extract
Figure 2. Core of PASTE.
helps us to produce traces from simulated erroneous imple-
mentations that we will use for obtaining the level of quality
of the invariants. Next, we introduce Mutants module and
present its functional aspects.
4 Mutants module
The main goal of this module is to generate a set of traces
in order to use them for testing the power of detection of er-
rors of the different invariants considered by the tester. In
order to do it, we apply a methodology based on mutation
testing. The specification is mutated in order to simulate
real faults and, from each mutant, a set of traces is gener-
ated. These traces will be checked with the set of available
invariants in order to determine , based on the obtained re-
sults, their level of detection of faults. We describe three
mutation operators that will be applied to a TFSM specifi-
cation. We only consider first order mutant, that is, mutants
obtained by the application of one mutation operator.
When we generate a mutant it may be functionally equiv-
alent to the original specification. In order to establish the
effectiveness of the invariants detecting faults we will not
consider the equivalent mutants. It is worth to remark that
we are interested in checking the power of the invariants to
detect faults. If we would use equivalent mutants, no error
would appear in the traces generated from them, so it would
not be useful for our goal. The notion of equivalence of a
mutant with respect to the specification follows a criterium
of inclusion of traces: A mutant is equivalent to the origi-
nal specification if for all possible sequences of inputs that
can be performed by the mutant and the specification the
outputs produced by the mutant are a subset of those con-
sidered by the specification. Intuitively, the mutant should
not invent behaviors when provided with inputs specified in
the specification. This pattern is borrowed from ioco [27].
Following, we formally define the mutation operators.
4.1 Mutation operators
In PASTE we consider three possible mutation operators:
Changing the Goal State of a transition(CGS), Changing
Output(CO), and Changing Time(CT). The first one corre-
sponds to create a mutant of an specification by changing
the goal state of a transition.
Definition 4 Let X = (S, I, O,→, s0) be a specification,
tc = (s, s′, i, o, F ) ∈→ a transition, and s′′ ∈ S with s′ =
s′′. We denote by Mcgs(tc,s′′) = (S, I, O,→′, s0) a new
TFSM where
→′= {tr|tr ∈→ ∧ tr = tc} ∪ {(s, s′′, i, o, F )}.
unionsq
The next mutation operator creates a mutant changing
the output associated to a transition in the specification.
Naturally, we must change the probability distribution func-
tion so that the mutant has regular stochastic information.
Definition 5 Let X = (S, I, O,→, s0) be a specifica-
tion, tc = (s, s′, i, o, F ) ∈→ a transition, and o′ ∈ O
such that o′ = o and there does not exist a transition
tc′ = (s, s′′, i, o′, F ′) ∈→. We denote by Mco(tc,o′) =
(S, I, O,→′, s0) a new TFSM where
→′= {tr|tr ∈→ ∧ tr = tc} ∪ {(s, s′, i, o′, F ′)}.
with
F ′ =
{
F if  ∃(si, sf , i, o
′, Ft) ∈→
Ft if ∃(si, sf , i, o
′, Ft) ∈→
where si, sf ∈ S and Ft ∈ F . unionsq
The condition “there does not exist a transition tc′ =
(s, s′′, i, o′, F ′) ∈→” is required in order to obtain a mutant
that simulates an implementation according to our assump-
tions, that is, the implementation must be deterministically
observable. Thus we do not accept to change an output
that generates a transition with the same input/output ac-
tions that other transition outgoing from the same state.
The last mutation operator alters the probability distribu-
tion function associated to a pair of input/output actions.
Definition 6 Let X = (S, I, O,→, s0) be a specification,
tc = (s, s′, i, o, F ) ∈→ a transition, and F ′ ∈ F with
F ′ = F . We denote by Mct(tc,F ′) = (S, I, O,→′, s0) a
new TFSM where
→′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
(s, s′, i′, o′, F )| (s, s′, i′, o′, F ) ∈→
∧
(i = i′ ∨ o = o′)
⎫⎬
⎭
⋃
{
(s, s′, i, o, F ′)| (s, s′, i, o, F ) ∈→
}
unionsq
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Xs1 s2
i1, o1, F1
i2, o2, F3
i1, o1, F1
i2, o1, F2
Mo
s1 s2
i1, o2, F1
i2, o2, F3
i1, o1, F1
i2, o1, F2
Ms
s1 s2
i1, o2, F1
i2, o2, F3
i1, o1, F1
i2, o1, F2
Figure 3. A specification and its mutants.
The possible mutations we can perform in the probabil-
ity distribution function of a transition must correspond to
possible real faults, that is, if the transition has associated
an exponential or binomial distribution function, a possi-
ble mutation of them should be an exponential or binomial
function where the value of the rate parameter (exponential)
or the number of trials and/or the success probability (bino-
mial) are changed. We do not consider the mutation of a
probability distribution from a Dirac to a uniform, it does
not reflects a natural mistake.
Example 2 Let us consider the specification X depicted
in Figure 3 and the invariant φ = i1/o1/F1, i1 	→
{〈o1, F1〉}. We can generate a mutant from the specifica-
tion by applying the mutation operator CO to the transition
(s1, s2, i1, o1, F1) for changing the output o1 into o2. We
would obtain the machineMo. If we generate a mutant from
the specification by applying the mutation operator CGS to
the transition (s2, s1, i1, o1, F1) for changing the final state
s1 into s2. We would obtain the machine Ms. unionsq
Once we have obtained the mutant, we will generate ran-
domly traces that we will test applying the invariants. These
traces will have different lengths. We have established the
minimum length of the traces in |S|.
5 Empirical Results
In this section we present the results obtained from the
empirical experiments we performed for estimating a mea-
sure of the effectiveness of the invariants detecting errors.
The specification used in this experiment is the one depicted
in Figure 1 and the invariants considered are the ones pre-
sented in Figure 4.
Although selected specification for performing experi-
ments presents a reduced size (10 states and 21 transitions),
it allowed us to generate all the possible mutants using the
mutation operators described in Section 4.1. First, we ap-
plied the CO operator to all the transitions, changing the
associated output by each output available in the specifica-
tion. Next, we applied the CGS operator modifying the final
state of the transitions to each of the states in the specifica-
tion. Thus, for these two operators we generated an exhaus-
tive set of mutants. However, this is not possible when we
apply the CT operator. In this case, the number of possibili-
ties for producing a mutant is astronomic so, we established
a finite number of changes for each probability distribution
function. We applied several factors of variation to the pa-
rameters that defines the distribution functions. In addition,
for each function we performed a number of mutations pro-
portional to the number of transitions labelled by it. In Fig-
ure 5 we show the amount of mutants generated by the tool
that are not non-equivalent to the specification taking into
account the mutation operator applied. It is worth to men-
tion that we only considered the non-equivalent mutants. In
other case, our invariants would not have detected any fault
for equivalent mutants.
Non equivalent mutants Total
CO CGS CT
201 230 207 638
Figure 5. Mutants generated.
Regarding to the set of invariants, we tried to select the
most representative and generic taking into account two
main criteria: the length and the inclusion of the wildcard
 (see φ20). Finally, some of them were designed for rep-
resenting a restriction of another one, for example, if φ12
matches a (sub)trace then, φ13 would match it too but φ12
is more restrictive than φ13.
Following, we extracted 10 traces from each mutant with
different length. In our experiment we considered traces of
length k · |S| with k ∈ {1..10}. All the invariants were ap-
plied to the set of traces. The results obtained were analyzed
taking into account the length of the invariants, the length
of the traces and the mutation operator that was applied for
generating the trace.
In Figure 6 we present the data corresponding to the
traces obtained from the application of the CO operator. In
the x−axis is represented the length of the traces, and in the
y−axis the amount of traces killed. The graph presents the
results classified by the length of the invariants. We observe
that the length of the trace analyzed affects the level of de-
tection of the invariants: greater length of the trace implies
better results. In addition, we observe that the invariants of
length 1 are the best ones for detecting mutations due to a
change of an output.
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φ1 = i2 	→ {〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o2, F1〉}
φ2 = i2 	→ {〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o2, F1〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ3 = i2 	→ {〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F1〉}
φ4 = i2 	→ {〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F1〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ5 = i2 	→ {〈o10, F3〉, 〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o2, F1〉}
φ6 = i2 	→ {〈o10, F3〉, 〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o2, F1〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ7 = i2 	→ {〈o10, F3〉, 〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F1〉}
φ8 = i2 	→ {〈o10, F3〉, 〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F1〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ9 = i1 	→ {〈o10, F1〉, 〈o7, F3〉, 〈o6, F2〉, 〈o5, F1〉, 〈o4, F3〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F3〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ10 = i1 	→ {〈o10, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F3〉, 〈o6, F2〉, 〈o5, F1〉, 〈o4, F3〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F3〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ11 = i2/o8/F2, i2 	→ {〈o10, F3〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o2, F1〉, 〈o1, F2〉}
φ12 = i2/o8/F2, i1 	→ {〈o10, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F3〉, 〈o6, F2〉, 〈o5, F1〉, 〈o4, F3〉, 〈o3, F1〉}
φ13 = i2/o8/F2, i1 	→ {〈o10, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F3〉, 〈o6, F2〉, 〈o5, F1〉, 〈o4, F3〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ14 = i2/o8/F2, i2 	→ {〈o10, F3〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F1〉}
φ15 = i1/o3/F1, i2 	→ {〈o9, F1〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F1〉, 〈o1, F2〉}
φ16 = i1/o3/F1, i1 	→ {〈o9, F3〉, 〈o7, F3〉, 〈o5, F1〉, 〈o4, F3〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F3〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ17 = i2/o8/F2, i1/o3/F1, i2 	→ {〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o2, F1〉}
φ18 = i2/o8/F2, i1/o3/F1, i2 	→ {〈o9, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F1〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F3〉, 〈o4, F2〉, 〈o2, F1〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ19 = i2/o8/F2, i1/o3/F1, i1 	→ {〈o10, F1〉, 〈o7, F3〉, 〈o6, F2〉, 〈o5, F1〉, 〈o4, F3〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F3〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ20 = i2/o8/F2, , i1 	→ {〈o10, F1〉, 〈o9, F1〉, 〈o7, F3〉, 〈o6, F2〉, 〈o5, F1〉, 〈o4, F3〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F3〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
φ21 = i1/o3/F1, i1/o3/F1, i1 	→ {〈o10, F1〉, 〈o8, F2〉, 〈o7, F3〉, 〈o6, F3〉, 〈o5, F1〉, 〈o4, F3〉, 〈o3, F1〉, 〈o2, F3〉, 〈o1, F1〉}
Figure 4. Invariant suite.
Figure 6. Killed mutants CO operator.
In Figure 7 we present the results obtained when we con-
sider the traces derived from the application of the mutation
operator CGS. Let us note that there exists a set of invari-
ants which are not able to kill any mutant, the invariants
of length 1. The reason is that the application of the CGS
operator does not affect the functional behaviour of the sys-
tem, that is, the mutation only changes the final state of a
transition, not the input/output/function that labels it. The
invariants of length 1 only require conditions over a pair of
input/output actions, and they have not been modified as re-
sult of the mutation. Thus, these invariants do not detect
any fault in the possible pairs of input/output actions in the
traces or the time values associated to them. We require
at least invariants of length 2 to find an error in a trace,
due to the fact that this kind of mutations are reflected in
the behaviour of the system following the execution of the
modified transition by the operator.
If we analyze the results obtained when we consider the
traces derived from the application of the mutation operator
Figure 7. Killed mutants CGS operator.
Figure 8. Killed mutants CT operator.
CT, represented in Figure 8, we only can conclude that the
traces must have a minimum length. This length depends
on the minimal size of the sample that we require in order
to check that it fits with the associated distribution function.
In this study we established a fix size of 10 time values for
the sample. However we cannot deduce a clear relation be-
tween the length of the invariant and its power of detection.
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Figure 9. Killed CO mutants by invariant.
Figure 10. Killed CGS mutants by invariant.
As we mentioned, in order to check the temporal require-
ments we apply a hypothesis contrast. It requires to choose
a level of confidence, that in our study has been established
to a fix value.
We also present the analysis of the behaviour of each of
the invariants when they are applied to the traces obtained
for the differentmutation operators, Figures 9, 10 and 11 for
CO operator, CGS operator and CT operator respectively.
In addition, we have also considered the global behaviour
of them, that is, the power of detection taking into account
the mutants obtained from the application of all the possible
operators (see Figure 12). The graphs present the percent-
age of traces killed by each of the 21 invariants, considering
the different lengths.
After performing these experiments, we have assigned a
Figure 11. Killed CT mutants by invariant.
Figure 12. Killed mutants by invariant.
level of effectiveness for each of the invariants. It is com-
puted by means of the next formula:
wCO ·MCO(φi) + wCT ·MCT (φi) + wCGS ·MCGS(φi)
NumTracesMut ·MTOT
where
∑
i∈{CO,CT,CGS}wi = 1.
The variables MCO(φi), MCGS(φi) and MCT (φi) rep-
resent the number of errors detected by the invariant φi
in the traces extracted from mutants obtained by applying
the CO, CGS and CT mutation operators, respectively.
The variable MTOT corresponds to the number of mutants
generated, and NumTracesMut represents the number of
traces extracted from each mutant. In this case study we
have 638 mutants and 10 traces have been generated from
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wco wct wcgs Invariant Suite
1
3
1
3
1
3
φ1 > φ3 > φ2 > φ5 > φ9 > φ15 > φ12 > φ16 > φ4  φ7
1 0 0 φ1 > φ3 > φ2 > φ5 > φ9 > φ4 > φ7 > φ6 > φ10 > φ16
0 1 0 φ17 > φ16 > φ14 > φ12 > φ1 > φ3 > φ2  φ5  φ7 > φ19
0 0 1 φ15 > φ12 > φ18 > φ17 > φ16 > φ14  φ19 > φ21 > φ11 > φ13
0.2 0.2 0.6 φ1 > φ15 > φ12 > φ3  φ16 > φ17 > φ2  φ5 > φ18 > φ9
0.4 0.4 0.2 φ1 > φ3 > φ2 > φ5 > φ9 > φ7 > φ4 > φ16 > φ15 > φ12
0.5 0.2 0.3 φ1 > φ3 > φ2 > φ5 > φ9 > φ4 > φ15 > φ7 > φ12  φ16
0.5 0.2 0.3 φ1 > φ3 > φ2  φ5 > φ12  φ15 > φ16 > φ17 > φ9 > φ18
Figure 13. Invariants Suite selected by preference.
each of them.
This formula provide us with the percentage of faults de-
tected by each invariant, according to the different weights
associated to the three kinds of mutants. The weights are in-
dicated by the values wCO , wCT and wCGS . These values
are selected by the tester according to her preferences for
detecting the different kinds of errors. In our case study we
have considered different values in order to obtain the most
adequate set of invariants for each of them. The results are
depicted in Figure 13. The expression φi > φj indicates
that the level of detection of φi is greater than the one of
φj . The difference may be very small, but there exist. If the
power of detection of both invariants is equal we represent it
by φi  φj . For example we can observe that if we assume
that the functional behaviour of the system is correct and we
are only interesting in checking the temporal behaviour, we
would select the third suite of invariants.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented the mutation testing
methodology that is applied in the tool PASTE. The tool
automates the passive testing approach for systems that
present stochastic timed restrictions introduced in previous
works. The invariants represent properties that the specifi-
cations, described by means of the formalism TFSM, must
fulfill. In order to check the effectiveness of the invariants
for detecting errors, the tool provides us with a functional-
ity based on a mutation testing methodology. The specifi-
cations are mutated using the mutation operators available
that are described in this work. Then, different traces are
extracted from the mutants that simulate real faults. These
traces are used to test if the invariants proposed by the tester
can find the errors and a measure of its effectiveness is es-
timated. In addition to introduce the formal details and the
description of how this module works we have presented
the analysis of the results obtained from the experiments
performed.
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